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Abstract 
This chapter takes as its departure point a neural level theory of insight that arose from studies of 
the sparse, distributed, content-addressable architecture of associative memory. It is argued that 
convergent thought is most fruitfully characterized in terms of, not the generation of a single 
correct solution (as it is conventionally construed), but using concepts in their most compact 
form by activating neural cell assemblies that respond to their most typical properties. This 
allows them to be deployed in a conventional manner such that effort is reserved for exploring 
causal relationships. Conversely, it is argued that divergent thought is most fruitfully 
characterized in terms of, not the generation of multiple solutions (as it is conventionally 
construed), but using concepts in a form that is, albeit expanded, constrained by the situation, by 
activating neural cell assemblies that respond to context-specific atypical properties. This allows 
them to be deployed in a manner that is conducive to exploring unconventional yet potentially 
relevant associations, and unearthing potentially useful relationships of correlation. Thus, 
divergent thought can involve as few as one idea. This proposal is compatible with widespread 
beliefs that (1) most creative tasks require not many solutions but one, yet entail both divergent 
and convergent thinking, and (2) not all problems with multiple solutions require creative 
thinking, and conversely, some problems with single solution do require creative thought. The 
chapter discusses how the ability to shift between convergent and divergent modes of thought 
may have evolved, and it concludes with educational and vocational implications. 
 
Keywords: analytic thought; associative thought; context, contextual focus, convergent thought, 
creativity, divergent thought, neurds 
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The Neural Basis and Evolution of Divergent and Convergent Thought 
It is standard to define convergent thinking problems as those with only one correct solution and 
divergent thinking problems as open-ended problems with multiple solutions (Guilford, 1950; 
Runco, 2010), and to essentially equate creativity with the capacity for convergent and divergent 
thinking (e.g., Onarheim & Friis-Olivarius, 2013), with divergent thinking the more important of 
the two for creativity. However, this conception of divergent and convergent thinking does not 
align with what people think of as creative.  
First, not all tasks with multiple solutions require creative thinking, such as task of 
responding to the question “what is something red?” Indeed, some problems with just one correct 
solution, such as the Remote Associates Test (RAT), require more creativity than coming up 
with things that are red. Second, it is often said that creative problem solving tasks “require both 
convergent and divergent thinking,” (e.g., Biggs, Fitzgerald, & Atkinson, 1971; Riddell et al, 
2007). However, given the conventional view of convergent/divergent thinking problems this 
makes no sense, for a problem either has one solution or it has multiple solutions; it can not have 
both. Third, and perhaps most importantly, does it really make sense to define creative thought in 
terms of the number of correct solutions, as opposed to the process by which those solutions are 
generated?  
In this chapter I hope to convince you that by looking to the neural level mechanisms 
underlying creative thought, and how these mechanisms evolved, we are led to a new conception 
of convergent and divergent thought. Specifically, I will argue that convergent thought is 
characterized, not by the generation of a single correct solution, but by conceiving of concepts in 
their conventional contexts. Likewise, it will be argued that divergent thought is characterized, 
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not by the generation of multiple solutions, but by playing with ‘halo of potentiality’ surrounding 
concepts−−new affordances yielded by new contexts−−to hone as few as a single idea. 
The chapter begins by summarizing a neural level explanation for creative insight that 
arose from studies of the architecture of associative memory. It then outlines problems with 
conventional conceptions of divergent and convergent thought. Finally, it proposes a new 
conception of divergent and convergent thought that is consistent with the architecture of 
associative memory, evolutionary considerations, and empirical studies of divergent and 
convergent processing. 
 
Conventional Conceptions of Divergent and Convergent Thought 
Psychological theories of creativity typically involve two modes of thought. As mentioned 
in the introduction, divergent thought is defined and measured in terms of the generation of 
multiple discrete, often unconventional possibilities, possibly due to defocused attention and 
facitilitatation of free-association by reduced latent inhibition (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 
2003). It is characterized as intuitive and reflective, and thought to predominate during idea 
generation (for a review see Runco, 2010; for comparison between divergent/convergent 
processes in creativity and dual process models of cognition, see Sowden, Pringle, & Gabora, 
2015). 
Divergent thought is contrasted with convergent thought, which as mentioned above is 
defined and measured in terms of the capacity to perform on tasks where there is a single correct 
solution. Convergent thought is characterized as critical and evaluative, and it is believed to 
predominate during the refinement, implementation, and testing of an idea, as involving selection 
or tweaking of the most promising possibilities. 
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Note the difference between how divergent and convergent are defined and measured, in 
terms of number of generated and/or acceptable solutions, versus how they are commonly 
conceived, in terms of cognitive processes. If one were to schematically illustrate divergent 
thought as it is defined and measured, one might draw a set of multiple blobs with well-defined 
edges to represent the multiple final outcomes generated, whereas if one were to schematically 
illustrate divergent thought as it is commonly conceived, one might draw a single blob with 
blurry edges, as is consistent with the literal meaning of divergent as “spreading out” (as in a 
divergence of a beam of light).1 Indeed there are several incompatibilities between how we 
define and measure divergent thought and how we informally conceive of it. The generation of 
multiple solutions may or may not involve defocused attention and associative memory. 
Moreover, in divergent thought as it is generally construed, the associative horizons simply 
widen generically instead of in a way that is tailored to the situation or context, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. (For these reasons, the term associative thought has sometimes been used to refer to 
creative thinking that involves defocused attention and context-sensitive associative processes, 
and the term analytic thought has sometimes been used to refer to creative thinking that involves 
focused attention and executive processes.) In short, the way we define and measure divergent 
and convergent thought is not consistent with how we appear to think about them. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
-------------------------------- 
Brief Summary of Research on the Neural Mechanisms of Creative Thinking 
We now review some well-established features of associative memory, and how they are 
believed to come together in creative thinking (Gabora, 2001, 2010; Gabora & Ranjan, 2013). 
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First, memory is sparse: the total number of neurons in the brain is smaller than the total number 
of stimuli in the world that could potentially be encoded in memory. Therefore, there exist 
stimuli that no neuron is tuned to respond to. However, as illustrated in Figure 2, the brain is able 
to encode (and respond to) these stimuli nevertheless because their representation is 
distributed—or spread out across a cell assembly containing many neurons—and likewise each 
neuron participates in encoding of many items. Neurons exhibit coarse coding: although each 
neuron responds maximally to a particular feature, dimension, or property, it responds to a lesser 
degree to similar properties. As illustrated in Figure 3, memory is also content addressable; there 
is a systematic relationship between stimulus content and the cell assemblies that encode it, such 
that memory items are evoked by stimuli that are similar or ‘resonant’ (Hebb, 1949).  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
-------------------------------- 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
-------------------------------- 
The fact that representations are distributed across cell assemblies of content-addressable 
neurons that are sensitive to particular high-level or low-level properties ensures the feasibility of 
forging associations amongst items that are related, perhaps in a surprising but useful or 
appealing way. This enables reinterpretation of higher-order relations between perceptual stimuli 
through synchronization of prefrontal neural populations (Penn, Holyoak, & Povinelli, 2008).  
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Figure 4 provides a simplified illustrative example of how this works. Let us consider the 
task of inventing a casual chair that would appeal to the free-spirited mindset of the 1960s.2 We 
imagine that the designer had recently thrown beanbags with a toddler, and consider what was 
going on at the neural level during the invention of the beanbag chair. The context of wanting to 
invent a comfortable chair could have elicited context-driven expansion of the concept CHAIR 
such that, not just neurons that respond to typical chair properties—such as ‘flat surface to sit 
on’—were activated, but also neurons that respond to context-relevant properties such as 
‘conforms to shape’. Activation of the neuron that responds to ‘conforms to shape’ causes 
associative retrieval of previously encountered items with this property, such as beanbags. The 
designer recognizes that while a little beanbag conforms to the hand, a giant one might conform 
to the body. The overlap in the distributed representations of ‘CHAIR in the context 
comfortable’ and ‘BEANBAG’ means that there is a route by which the first could elicit 
associative retrieval of the second, culminating in invention of BEANBAG CHAIR.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 About Here 
-------------------------------- 
Note that an associative memory that encodes items in less detail might not contain a 
neuron that responds to objects with the property ‘conforms to shape’. In this case, the context 
‘comfortable’ could not elicit associative retrieval of BEANBAG and bring about the invention 
of BEANBAG CHAIR. 
Thus, the sparse, distributed, content-addressable nature of memory is critical for 
creativity. The fact that associations come to mind spontaneously as a result of representational 
overlap due to sharing of features encoded by content-addressable neurons means there is no 
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need for memory to be searched or randomly sampled for creative associations to be made 
(Gabora, 2001, 2010). The more detail with which stimuli and experiences are encoded in 
memory, the greater the degree to which their distributed representations overlap, and the more 
potential routes by which they can act as contexts for one another and combine. They may have 
been encoded at different times, under different circumstances, and the relationship between 
them never explicitly noticed, but some situation could come along and make their relationship 
apparent. 
There is empirical evidence for oscillations in convergent and divergent thinking, and a 
relationship between divergent thinking and chaos (Guastello, 1998). The capacity to shift 
between different modes of thought has been referred to as contextual focus (CF) (Gabora, 
2003). While some dual processing theories (e.g., Evans, 2003) make the split between automatic 
and deliberate processes, CF makes the split between an associative mode conducive to detecting 
relationships of correlation, and an analytic mode conducive to detecting relationships of 
causation. Defocusing attention facilitates associative thought by diffusely activating a broad 
region of memory, enabling obscure (though potentially relevant) aspects of a situation to come 
into play. Focusing attention facilitates analytic thought by constraining activation such that 
items are considered in a compact form that is amenable to complex mental operations. 
A plausible neural mechanism for CF has been proposed (Gabora, 2010; Gabora & Ranjan, 
2013). In a state of defocused attention more aspects of a situation are processed, the set of 
activated properties is larger, and thus the set of possible associations is larger. Activation flows 
from specific instances, to the abstractions they instantiate, to other seemingly unrelated 
instances of those abstractions. Cell assemblies that would not be activated in analytic thought 
but that would be in associative thought are referred to as neurds (see also Ellamil, Dobson, 
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Beeman, & Christoff, 2012; Yoruk & Runco, 2014). Neurds respond to properties that are of 
marginal relevance to the current thought. They do not reside in any particular region of 
memory; the subset of cell assemblies that count as neurds shifts depending on the situation. For 
each different perspective one takes on an idea, a different group of neurds participates. 
Neurds may generally be excluded from activated cell assemblies, becoming active only 
when there is a need to break out of a rut. In associative thought, diffuse activation causes more 
cell assemblies to be recruited, including neurds, enabling one thought to stray far from the 
preceding one while retaining a thread of continuity. Thus, the associative network is not just 
penetrated deeply, but traversed quickly. There is greater potential for overlapping 
representations to be experienced as wholes, resulting in the uniting of previously disparate ideas 
or concepts. While the preparation phase of the creative process likely involves long-term change 
to how ideas are encoded in the neocortex, the merging of thoughts culminating in insight may 
involve recurrent connections in the hippocampus, particularly when the insight involves 
generalization and inference triggered by a particular recent experience— (Kumaran & 
McClelland, 2012). Research on the neuroscience of insight suggests that alpha band activity in 
the right occipital cortex causes neural inhibition of sensory inputs, which enhances the relative 
influence of internally derived (“non-sensory”) inputs, and thus the forging of new connections 
(Kounios & Beeman, 2009, 2014). Following insight, the shift to an analytic mode of thought 
could be accomplished through decruitment of neurds. Findings that the right hemisphere tends 
to engage in coarser semantic coding and have wider neuronal input fields than the left (Jung-
Beeman, 2005; Kounios & Beeman, 2014) suggest that the right hemisphere may predominate 
during associative thought while the left predominates during analytic thought. In short, the 
architecture of associative memory is conducive to self-supervised learning and achievement of a 
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more coherent network of understandings, with creative output as an external manifestation of 
this process. 
 
A New Conception of Divergent and Convergent Thought 
Having examined how creative connections are forged in associative memory, we are led 
to the suggestion that instead of characterizing convergent thought in terms of the generation of a 
single correct solution, it be characterized in terms of sticking to conventional contexts, such as 
the context car when thinking of the concept TIRE. Similarly, it is proposed that divergent 
thought be characterized not by the generation of multiple solutions, but by capitalizing on the 
capacity to re-view an idea from new, context-relevant perspectives, using shared properties of 
concepts as bridges, to hone as few as a single idea. This is consistent with the RAT having only 
one solution yet requiring a more creative kind of thought than answering the question ‘what is 
red’, which has many possible solutions. Answering the question ‘what is red’ does not require 
thinking of concepts in unconventional contexts. In contrast, the RAT does require thinking of 
concepts in unconventional contexts. For example, consider the RAT question: what is the 
common associate of TANK, HILL and SECRET? The correct answer is TOP. To arrive at the 
correct answer, it is necessary to conceive of the concept TOP in very different ways. 
For an everyday example of how this might work outside of creative thinking tests, 
consider how the concept TIRE might be brought to mind in a divergent mode of thought, as 
illustrated schematically in Figure 5. In its conventional context car, the concept TIRE collapses 
on tire-relevant properties such as ‘goes on wheel’ and ‘filled with air’. However, in the 
unconventional context playground equipment, the concept TIRE might collapse on the 
properties that you could hang it and sit on it, which are essential for conceiving of it as a 
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possible swing. In an even less conventional context, pet needs, the concept TIRE might 
collapses on the property ‘small animal could sleep in it’, which might enable it to be conceived 
of as a bed for a dog. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 About Here 
-------------------------------- 
This view of convergent and divergent thought arose as part of the honing theory of 
creativity (Gabora, in press), according to which creativity is a byproduct of the self-organizing, 
self-mending nature of a mind, and its proclivity to minimize what Hirsh, Mar, and Peterson 
(2012) refer to as psychological entropy: arousal-generating uncertainty. Honing theory grew out 
of a mathematical theory of concepts and their combinations, referred to as the State COntext 
Property theory (SCOP) (e.g., Aerts, Gabora, & Sozzo, 2013; Gabora & Aerts, 2002).As such, it 
takes seriously the need to formally model and study the chameleon-like way concepts change in 
response to new contexts, as well as the ill-formed, intermediate,or ‘half-baked’ states an idea 
can be in as it is being mulled over (e.g., Gabora & Carbert, 2015). Using data from a study in 
which participants rated the typicality of exemplars of a concept for different contexts, SCOP 
was able to model how the typicality of different contexts changes during a shift from a 
convergent (analytic) to a divergent (associative) mode of thought, such that seemingly atypical 
exemplars of the concept (e.g., PILON as an exemplar of the concept HAT) can emerge (Veloz, 
Gabora, Eyjolfson, & Aerts, 2011). 
This conception of convergent and divergent thought is consistent with the widely-held 
view that divergent thought is conducive to insight, abduction, viewing situations from new 
perspectives, escaping fixation, and insight, while convergent thought is conducive to logic and 
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the refinement of ideas. On the face of it, it is not obvious that fluency, or the capacity to 
generate many solutions, should equate with the kind of deep, prolonged, complex thought 
necessary for many creative accomplishments. However, if divergent thought is conceived of in 
terms of the capacity to conceive of the state of the problem or task in a new context, which 
yields a new state of the problem, and so on recursively until psychological entropy reaches an 
acceptable level, it becomes natural to equate divergent thinking with the kind of deep, 
prolonged, complex thought necessary for even big-C creativity. 
 
The Evolution of Convergent and Divergent Thought 
Let us now examine how evolutionary considerations bear on the question of how divergent and 
convergent thinking problems are most fruitfully conceived. Does there exist a mechanism by 
which the brain could have evolved the capacity to engage in two kinds of thought processes, 
one for problems for which there is only one solution, and the other for problems that afford 
multiple solutions, as conventional views of convergent and divergent thinking would suggest? 
The answer must be no, for how could a brain even know, when the problem is first encountered, 
how many solution paths there are? Indeed, as strikingly demonstrated by the Indian 
mathematician Srinivasa Ramanujan, problems that are initially thought to have only one 
solution may later be revealed to be solvable by other means.  
 Now let us consider: does there exist a mechanism by which the brain would evolve the 
capacity to vary the extent to which context-specific aspects of a situation cause activation of the 
atypical yet potentially relevant properties that drive creative associations, as suggested by the 
view of convergent and divergent thinking proposed here? The answer is yes.  
More specifically, a multifaceted program of research has been exploring the hypothesis 
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that open-ended cultural evolution came about through two temporally-distinct cognitive 
transitions (Gabora, 2001, 2013; Gabora & Aerts, 2009; Gabora & Kaufman, 2010; Gabora & 
Kitto, 2013; Gabora & Smith, submitted). First, the emergence of Homo-specific culture 
approximately two million years ago, characterized most notably by the onset of primitive tool 
use, resulted from localized clustering of concepts, enabling the redescription and chaining of 
thoughts and actions, and the capacity for a stream of thought. This enabled a limited form of 
divergent thinking involving close associates but not remote ones.  
Second, fully cognitive modernity and what Mithen (1996) refers to as the birth of art, 
science, and religion, following the appearance of anatomical modernity after 200,000 years ago 
during the Middle-Upper Paleolithic resulted from the onset of contextual focus (CF): the ability 
to shift along the spectrum from an extremely convergent mode on the one hand, to an extremely 
divergent mode on the other, involving remote associates as well as close ones. Thereafter, the 
fruits of divergent thought could now be used as ingredients for convergent thought, and vice 
versa. This paved the way for cognitive integration, which enabled the ongoing assimilation of 
new experiences and accommodation of the network of previous experiences.  
It has been proposed that the onset of CF was made possible by a mutation of the FOXP2 
gene known to have occurred in the Paleolithic period (Chrusch & Gabora, 2014). Although 
FOXP2 was initially called the “language gene”, further research revealed that it is not uniquely 
associated with language. This suggests that the modified form of FOXP2 may have enabled the 
fine-tuning of the neurological mechanisms underlying the more general capacity to tailor their 
mode of thought to the situation at hand.  
The proposal that the cultural transition of the Middle/Upper Paleolithic was due to the 
onset of contextual focus is consistent with Mithen’s (1998) hypothesis that it was due to the 
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onset of cognitive fluidity—the capacity to explore, map, and transform conceptual spaces across 
different knowledge systems—for contextual focus would enable one to engage in cognitive 
fluidity when it was appropriate, and then shift back to a more convergent mode of thought when 
unnecessary associations would be a distraction. 
This two-transition theory is supported by simulations of chaining and CF carried out 
using an agent-based model of cultural evolution in which agents invent ideas for actions and 
imitate the fittest of their neighbors’ actions (Gabora, Chia, & Firouzi, 2013). The mean fitness 
and diversity of actions across the model society increased with chaining, and even more so with 
CF, consistent with the hypothesis that these simulations broadly capture at an algorithmic level 
the mechanisms underlying the two cultural transitions. CF was particularly effective when the 
environment changed, which supports its hypothesized role in escaping fixation. CF has also 
been implemented in computational models of creativity, resulting in complex and fascinating 
works of music (Bell & Gabora, 2016) and art (DiPaola, & Gabora, 2009; McCaig, DiPaola, & 
Gabora, 2016). 
 
Summary, Conclusions, and Practical Implications 
It has been proposed that by looking at the neural basis and evolution of creative thinking, it 
becomes apparent that creative thinking might fruitfully diverge, not in the sense that it 
(necessarily) results in the generation of multiple ideas, but in the sense of construing each 
concept in a manner that blurs distinctions between it and other concepts, thereby inviting 
associations. It is interesting that this is analogous to the way that ‘divergent’ is used with respect 
to light; divergent light does not consist of multiple small, focused beams, but rather a diffuse 
beam. 
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The proposed conception of divergent and convergent thinking suggests that conventional 
creativity tests as they are commonly used in educational and vocational settings may not be 
ideal. Both conventional tests of divergent thinking (such as the alternate uses test, which 
involves questions such as ‘How many uses can you think of for a brick?) and of convergent 
thinking (such as the RAT discussed previously) may be assessing only a minor aspect of what 
the creative process entails. Creativity may be largely about tuning one’s mode of thought in a 
context-specific manner such that each concept’s halo of potential associations is tuned to match 
to the specifics of the task and how far along one is in it. To tap into this, it may be necessary to 
use a new breed of creativity tests that investigate how individuals shift between divergent and 
convergent modes of thought over the course of a creative task. Such tests are just beginning to 
be developed (e.g., Armen, 2015; Pringle, 2011; Pringle & Sowden, 2016; Pringle, Sowden, 
Deeley, & Sharma, in press).  
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Figure 1. Neural-level illustration of context-dependency of creative thought. Small closed 
circles represent neural cell assemblies activated when thinking of CHAIR (regardless of which 
mode of thought). Small open circles represent neurons activated only in divergent thought 
referred to as ‘neurds’. The top figure illustrates divergent thought as it is conventionally 
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construed. The bottom two illustrate the new conception of divergent thought. Notice that the 
subset of neurons that act as neurds in one context is not the same as the subset of neurons that 
act as neurds in a different context. Thus, given the context living room, the property ‘tassels’ 
might be activated (middle figure), but not in the context outdoors; in that context ‘plastic’ might 
be activated (bottom figure).  
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Figure 2. (a) In this schematic illustration of a portion of memory, the circles represent neurons, 
and the orange bars represent properties responded to by particular neurons—in this case, lines 
of a particular orientation. Since the total number of neurons in the brain is smaller than the total 
number of stimuli in the world that could potentially be encoded in memory, there exist stimuli 
that no neuron is tuned to respond to—such as, in this illustration, the line oriented at 15 to the 
left. Therefore, the question arises how the brain is nevertheless able to encode (and respond to) 
so many stimuli. (b) In this more detailed schematic representation of this portion of memory, 
each vertex represents a possible property, and each black ring represents a property that actually 
elicits maximal response from an existing neuron. (Thus, the fact that the number of neurons is 
smaller than the number of potential stimuli is represented by the fact that not all vertices have 
black circles.) The reason the 15 line can be encoded in memory is because its representation is 
distributed, or spread out across a cell assembly containing many neurons. The diffuse white 
circle indicates the region activated by the 15 line. For simplicity it contains only three neurons; 
in a real brain it would contain many more. 
  
(a) (b) 
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Figure 3. As in Figure 2, in this schematic illustration of a portion of memory, the circles 
represent neurons, and the orange bars represent properties responded to by particular neurons—
in this case, lines of a particular orientation. Each of the four panels depicts a line of a particular 
orientation, and the corresponding region of memory activated by that stimulus. The fact that 
memory is content-addressable is illustrated by the fact that there is a systematic relationship 
between the stimulus content and where it gets encoded. Specifically, (b) depicts a stimulus that 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
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is similar to that in (a), and a nearby region of memory is activated, whereas (c) depicts a 
stimulus that is quite different to that in (a), and the region activated is further away. The 
stimulus in (d) is so similar to that in (a) that it activates the same region of memory.  
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Figure 4. These panels provide a schematic illustration of a portion of memory in the process of 
inventing a beanbag chair. The circles represent neurons that respond to properties of objects 
such as chairs and beanbags. (a) The first panel depicts activation of the concept CHAIR in the 
absence of the goal of inventing a comfortable chair. Neurons that respond to only the most 
typical properties of CHAIR—such as that it has a flat surface and legs—are activated, and these 
are represented for simplicity as neurons A and B. (b) In the context of wanting to invent a 
(a) (b) 
(c) (d) 
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comfortable chair, a fine-grained associative memory can expand its conception of CHAIR to 
additionally activate neurons that respond to context-relevant properties such as comfort. This is 
depicted as activation of neuron C that responds to ‘conforms to shape’. (c) The concept 
BEANBAG is encoded in neurons C, D, and E, where C still responds to ‘conforms to shape’, 
and D and E respond to other typical beanbag properties such as that it is small and square. The 
overlap in the distributed representations of ‘CHAIR in the context comfortable’ and 
‘BEANBAG’ means that there is a route by which the first can elicit associative retrieval of the 
second, culminating in invention of BEANBAG CHAIR. (d) The bottom right panel depicts an 
associative memory that encodes items in less detail. It does not contain a neuron that responds 
to objects with the property ‘conforms to shape’. With CHAIR now activating only neurons A 
and B, and BEANBAG activating only neurons D and E, the context ‘comfortable’ cannot elicit 
associative retrieval of BEANBAG. Thus, this degree of detail is insufficient to bring about the 
invention of BEANBAG CHAIR.  
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Figure 5. (a) The top left figure is a schematic depiction of the concept TIRE in its state of full 
potentiality, with many potential properties or affordances. (b) The top right figure depicts how, 
in its conventional context car, the concept TIRE collapses on tire-relevant properties such as 
‘goes on wheel’ and ‘filled with air’. (c) The bottom left figure depicts how, in the 
unconventional context playground equipment, the concept TIRE collapses on the properties that 
you could hang it and sit on it, which are essential for conceiving of it as a possible swing. (d) 
The bottom right figure depicts how, in an even more unconventional context for this concept, 
pet needs, it collapses on the property ‘small animal could sleep in it’, which is essential for 
conceiving of it as a dog bed. 
                                                 
1 For more on how light can be used as a metaphor for cognition see (Gabora, 2014, 2015). 
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2  The earliest artifact that could be called a beanbag chair, referred to as a sacco, was 
introduced in 1968 by three Italian designers: Piero Gatti, Cesare Paolini and Franco Teodoro 
as part of the Italian Modernism movement. 
